Abstract:
Introduction
Whether the monitoring and publication of information about the performance of producers or suppliers can induce change in their behavior or performance has been the subject of much economic analysis, both theoretical and empirical. As Akerlof (1970) showed, in the presence of information asymmetry, in which sellers know more about the quality of their products than buyers, moral hazard will drive an equilibrium result in which high-quality products will not be available. Holmström (1982) derived conceptual results showing that systems under which the performance of agents is evaluated and disclosed can be used to reduce the costs of moral hazard. Using plant-level administrative data, we study the response of chicken-slaughter plants to the mandatory disclosure of information about plants with poor performance on food-safety tests. In particular, from 2008 to 2017, the USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) published the names of plants that performed poorly on repeated tests for Salmonella in chicken carcasses on its public website. We find evidence that the disclosure of information about poorly-performing plants had a limited effect on plant performance on Salmonella tests. Instead, we find that plants' performance on tests for Salmonella in chicken improved markedly (a) after FSIS announced plans, in 2003, to update regulations and publish individual plants' performance results and (b) after FSIS significantly tightened the Salmonella standards plants had to meet to continue operation and production and, simultaneously, the performance threshold required to be met to avoid public identification as a poorly-performing plant. Our results suggest that information disclosure alone had a limited effect on buyer perception about quality and that, in this market, other factors-including stringency of regulations-played a much more important role in determining food-safety outcomes. Dranove and Jin (2010) provide an excellent review of the literature on quality disclosure and certification and discuss the concept of "unraveling", in which buyers should be able to deduce undisclosed quality on the basis of similar products whose (good or poor) quality is disclosed. Importantly, unraveling is not always observed; there is much evidence of buyers not being able to deduce the quality of products or firms when disclosure is not mandatory, or when labels are lacking (e.g., Liaukonyte et al., 2013; McFadden and Lusk, 2017) . Most of the existing empirical analysis of "seller" (i.e., scrutinized party) response to third-party quality disclosure has focused on education (see the review by Dranove and Jin, 2010 ) and choice of hospitals or HMOs (e.g., Dafny and Dranove, 2008; Pope, 2009; Varkevisser, van der Geest, and Schut, 2012 ).
Our paper is in the spirit of Jin and Leslie (2003) , who found that when Los Angeles County introduced a requirement that hygiene-quality cards be placed in restaurant windows, restaurant health-inspection scores increased and the number of foodborne illness hospitalizations decreased. Furthermore, restaurants with higher posted health grades enjoyed increased revenues. In a follow-up study, Jin and Leslie (2009) found that heterogeneity in consumer responses to the posting of hygiene-quality cards was driven by the reputations of chain restaurants and also by geography, in that repeated visits and word of mouth were more important in determining consumers' behavior in certain parts of Los Angeles County. In a similar vein, Bennear and Olmstead (2008) found that the disclosure of information about health violations in community drinking water systems as the result of the 1996 Amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) reduced violations in Massachusetts. Our analysis is the first to demonstrate the effects of the disclosure of food-safety information on the performance of food processors.
Many other studies have shown that consumers responded to positive or negative information about products or producers, especially in the context of health risks or food safety.
Tiesl, Roe, and Hicks (2002) found that provision of positive information about canned tuna (namely, the dolphin-safe label) increased the market share of canned tuna. Graff Zivin, Neidell, and Schlenker (2011) found that bottled-water demand increased in Northern California and Nevada in response to local violations of the Safe Drinking Water Act. Product recalls for foodsafety problems have adversely affected firm stock prices (Salin and Hooker, 2001; Thomsen and McKenzie, 2001; Pozo and Schroeder, 2016) , futures prices (Lusk and Schroeder, 2002; Moghadam, Schmidt and Grier, 2013) , and product demand (Thomsen, Shiptsova, and Hamm, 2006; Piggott and Marsh, 2004; Marsh, Schroeder, and Mintert, 2004; Arnade, Calvin and Kuchler, 2009) . Perhaps negative information about food safety prompts a visceral reaction, and buyers are more likely to react to negative information than to positive information; Bovay (2017) found no evidence that wholesale buyers increased demand for fresh tomatoes from certain regions when growers in those regions collectively adopted food-safety standards.
In the following section, we provide an overview of the inspection of meat products in the United States and review recent policy changes regarding inspection of chicken for Salmonella. We then discuss our data and empirical strategy. Our results show that FSIS policy changes resulted in improvements in Salmonella test results, and that anticipation of pending regulation and disclosure of information on poorly-performing plants both affected plant-level Salmonella outcomes. The article concludes with a discussion of the mechanisms that may explain the observed results.
Background and Regulatory Context
Food-safety problems remain a threat to public health in part because the presence of pathogens cannot be observed without considerable expense. Because of the expense of measuring food safety and the myriad ways that food may become contaminated, information about food safety can be characterized as both asymmetric and imperfect, even after food is sold and consumed.
(In other words, food safety is not always an experience attribute.) The information asymmetry gives producers incentives to invest less in food safety than the socially optimal level, and less than they would if information were symmetric. This incentive may be tempered by the threat of a recall or other legal consequences for food-safety problems (see discussion above). However, recalls for known food-borne illness outbreaks account for only a small share of all food-borne illnesses (Painter et al., 2013) .
To offset the incentives of suppliers to cut corners and underinvest in food safety, buyers may impose private, enforceable standards for food safety on their suppliers. Jack in the Box restaurant, for example, instituted numerous safeguards after its near-bankruptcy due to a foodborne-illness outbreak in the early 1990s (Golan et al., 2004) , and the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service has imposed strict standards on ground beef suppliers to the National School Lunch Program (Ollinger and Bovay, 2017) . More broadly, contract standards are being used in international commerce under the Global Food Safety Initiative (a global, industry-driven collaboration). provision of requires slaughter establishments for young chickens to meet a Salmonella sampling standard based on typical Salmonella levels at that time. FSIS verifies through routine sampling that establishments meet this standard. However, more than twenty years after the promulgation of PR/HACCP, the safety of meat and poultry remains a serious concern for public health officials. Painter et al. (2013) estimated that poultry contaminated with Salmonella and other bacteria caused 650,000 illnesses per year for U.S. consumers over 1998−2008. PR/HACCP encouraged greater food safety effort, but PR/HACCP did not address the fundamental problem with food safety in that food safety is costly to provide (Antle, 2000) and buyers are unable to evaluate food safety without undertaking costly tests (Antle, 2001; Golan et al., 2004) . Williams and Ebel (2012) found that PR/HACCP reduced chicken-related salmonellosis illnesses by 190,000 over 1996-2000 but had little effect afterward. Product recalls create some direct incentive for firms to provide safe food, but Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) data (Painter et al., 2013) indicate that most foodborne illnesses are not linked to a product recall and therefore suppliers are rarely held accountable unless buyers require random tests of products for pathogens and other contaminants.
PR/HACCP forced plants to implement food-safety process controls, but it did not give buyers any new information about food-safety practices or outcomes, making it useless for evaluating plant food safety and for providing incentives to improve food safety. FSIS lowered its Salmonella tolerance for young chicken carcasses by more than half, and stopped publishing the names of Category 2 plants on its website. Further regulatory changes followed, but are beyond the scope of our analysis.
In the following sections, we develop a series of empirical tests to analyze the effect of regulatory change and information disclosure on Salmonella test outcomes.
Data
We created a unique data set of all plants that slaughtered young chicken and whose products During the timeframe of our study, testing was done in batches or sample sets of 51, spread out over some period of days or weeks. Thus, testing may have begun for some establishments in one year and extended into the subsequent year, leaving a partial sample set for the data we analyze.
As seen in figure 1, In most of our regression specifications, we include several additional controls for plantlevel characteristics including compliance with process controls required under PR/HACCP.
Most of these control variables have been found to affect performance on Salmonella tests.
These include (a) number of chickens slaughtered, a well-accepted measure of plant size (Ollinger and Moore, 2009 ); (b) age of plant, in years (Muth et al., 2007) ; (c) share of slaughtered animals that were not chickens; (d) a dummy variable to indicate whether the plant cooked or in any way further processed chicken, which adds complexity to a plant's operations (Ollinger and Moore, 2008) ; and (e) a dummy variable to indicate whether the plant was part of a multi-plant firm, which also adds complexity. We also control for compliance rates with HACCP tasks, pre-operational SSOP tasks, and operational SSOP tasks.
Effect of information disclosure on plants' ability to meet Salmonella performance thresholds
In our main empirical specification, we use a fixed-effects logit regression (see Chamberlain, 1980, and Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, pp. 796-797) In our main empirical specification, we estimate the effects of (firms' anticipation about future requirements for) information disclosure on plants' probabilities of achieving Salmonella levels equivalent to the standards for Category 1 and various more stringent thresholds. We use a logit regression with plant-level fixed effects, as given by equation (1) 
Effect of information disclosure on share of samples testing positive for Salmonella
The However, the information disclosure policy is not shown to have had a special effect on the plants whose names were most likely to have been disclosed as having poor performance on tests for Salmonella. We now explore several potential explanations for this finding.
First, the results of tests for Salmonella in chicken carcasses may be of limited importance to buyers, as compared with other product or firm attributes such as price, brand, and intended use (such as processing). Furthermore, chicken is almost always cooked to a temperature that kills Salmonella, and a reduction in the probability that a piece of raw chicken
contains Salmonella from 14% to 12% (as implied by the difference between Category 2 and Category 1) should not substantively change buyer or consumer attitudes toward risk and chicken consumption.
Lack of salience of the published information may also have dampened the response of the producers most directly affected by it. Food recalls often (but do not always) generate headlines, and perhaps grocers and other buyers avoid buying food from producers that have recently faced recalls because consumers are more likely to be aware of recalls and buyers'
reputations are more likely to be at stake. Furthermore, contracts between buyers and producers may require private food-safety standards like GFSI be met, and these private standards may take precedent over potentially less-stringent and less-frequent government testing results. we lack data to compare the effects of limited disclosure and unraveling with the effects of fully symmetric information disclosure, as Jin and Leslie (2003) were able to do.
In conclusion, we suggest that the anticipation of unknown policy changes after the 2003 FSIS announcement was sufficient to motivate improved Salmonella test outcomes for the worstperforming plants. The regulatory change in 2006 that tightened the regulatory standard by moving from a four-strikes policy to a one-strike policy was substantially more effective than the publication of information about the worst-performing firms, even for those firms that were most likely to face public scrutiny as a result of the information-disclosure policy. As we discuss, Notes: Dependent variable in columns 7-9: whether plant had the equivalent of 2 or fewer positive samples out of 51, i.e., whether plant had no more than 3.92 percent of samples testing positive for Salmonella. Dependent variable in columns 10-11: whether plant had the equivalent of 1 or fewer positive samples out of 51, i.e., whether plant had no more than 1.96 percent of samples testing positive for Salmonella. Plant-level cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Single, double, and triple asterisks (*, **, ***) represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
